

## **PITF - STATE FAILURE PROBLEM SET:**

Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955-2013

### **Political Instability (formerly, State Failure) Task Force (PITF)**

#### **DATASET AND CODING GUIDELINES**

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## **I. DATASET AND SPREADSHEETS**

The State Failure Problem Set dataset and spreadsheets were originally prepared in 1994 by researchers at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland under the direction of Ted Robert Gurr and subject to the review of the, then, State Failure Task Force. The Problem Set was subsequently reviewed, revised, and updated on an annual basis through 1999 under the direction of Ted Gurr and, beginning in 1999, Monty G. Marshall at CIDCM. In late 1999, the Problem Set updating and review process was changed to a semi-annual cycle (late spring and late fall). In January 2001, a major review and revision of the Problem Set coding guidelines and dataset, under the direction of Monty G. Marshall, was concluded that substantially altered the case identifications and case parameters recorded in the Problem Set. The January 2001 revision of the State Failure Problem Set coding guidelines are described below; the description for “Collapse of Central Authority” under “Adverse Regime Changes” (section III.1) was revised in April 2009 to provide greater clarity. Beginning in February 2005, the State Failure Problem Set was maintained, updated, and revised

under the direction of Monty G. Marshall at the Center for Global Policy, George Mason University. Since August 2010, the Problem Set has been managed by Societal-Systems Research Inc.

Four distinct types of state failure events are included in the Problem Set: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides. The coding rules covering each type of event are defined below. Each of the four distinct events is covered in a separate dataset and spreadsheet. The basic structure of the data is the “case-year” format, that is, there is a separate case-entry for each additional year of a multi-year episode. The annual event records include the following information for each case: country, month and year of onset, month and year of ending (unless ongoing at the end of the update year), type of case, and annual codes on magnitude variables; only the first annual record for each event contains a brief narrative description of the event.

Often, state failures are complex cases involving more than one distinct event type; also common are war events that have both political and ethnic characteristics. In general, complex events are made up of two or more temporally-linked wars and crises. When state failure events overlap or when five years or less separate the end of one event and the onset of the next, they have been combined, or “consolidated,” for some analytic purposes (i.e., the “consolidated event” is used as the dependent variable in statistical analyses of the global and regional models). A fifth Problem Set dataset and spreadsheet has been created that lists these “consolidated” state failure events. The distinct state failure events that have been combined to create each consolidated event, and their dates if different from the inclusive dates of the complex event, are noted in the event description for each event record (159 consolidated cases total: see PITF Consolidated Case List 2013.pdf).

There are four versions of the State Failure Problem Set data; the data files are written in Microsoft Excel format. The four versions are as follows:

PITF Ethnic War 2013.xls (87 episodes; 883 case-years)  
PITF Revolutionary War 2013.xls (72 episodes; 551 case-years)  
PITF Adverse Regime Change 2013.xls (125 episodes; 321 case-years)  
PITF GenoPoliticide 2013.xls (43 episodes; 278 case-years)

**Please note:**

In prior versions of the PITF State Failure Problem Set, some cases were listed as both ethnic and revolutionary wars; this added some confusion and the possibility of double-counting cases. All cases have been listed herein according to their most prevalent form, eliminating dual listing.

The 1990s political restructuring that many former Socialist Bloc countries have undergone has created many new states and, thus, complicated data compilation. Be aware that some data inconsistencies may be found. Some conflict processes in the newly constituted states have their beginnings in the former alignment, so, beginning years listed (YRBEGIN) may have occurred prior to the date of officially recognized statehood.

## **I.1 Variables Listed**

**The common variables listed in each data version are as follows:**

**COUNTRY**

Country name

**SCODE (3-alpha)**

3-letter alpha country code

**CCODE (3-numeric)**

Singer country code

**YEAR (4-numeric)**

4-digit case year

**MOBEGIN (2-numeric)**

2-number numeric month denoting event beginning

**YRBEGIN (4-numeric)**

4-number numeric year denoting event beginning

**MOEND (2-numeric)**

2-number numeric month denoting event ending (99=ongoing)

**YREND (4-numeric)**

4-number numeric year denoting event ending (9999=ongoing)

**PTYPE (1-numeric)**

1-number event type (1=ETH; 2=REV; 3=REG; 4=GEN)

**DESC**

Brief alpha text description identifying specific event (only included with first case-year in multi-year episodes)

**DESC2 (1-numeric)**

Numeric marker denoting first annual record for a continuous case

**Variables specific to the Ethnic and Revolutionary War episodes are as follows:**

**MAGFIGHT (1-numeric)**

Scaled number of rebel combatants or activists (range 0-4; 9=missing)

**MAGFATAL (1-numeric)**

Scaled annual number of fatalities related to fighting (range 0-4; 9=missing)

**MAGAREA (1-numeric)**

Scaled portion of country affected by fighting (range 0-4; 9=missing)

**AVEMAG (1.1-numeric)**

Average of the three magnitude scores (range 0-4.0; 9=missing)

**Variables specific to the Adverse Regime Change episodes are as follows:**

**MAGFAIL (1-numeric)**

Scaled failure of State authority (range 1-4; 9=missing)

**MAGCOL (1-numeric)**

Scaled collapse of democratic institutions (range 1-4; 9=missing)

**MAGVIOL (1-numeric)**

Scaled violence associated with regime transition (range 1-4; 9=missing)

**MAGAVE (1.1-numeric)**

Average of the three magnitude scores (range 1-4.0; 9=missing)

**POLITYX (4-alpha/numeric)**

Indicator of the type/magnitude of regime change

**Variables specific to the Genocide/Politicide episodes are as follows:**

**DEATHMAG (1.1-numeric)**

Scaled annual number of deaths (range 0-5.0)

## **II. REVOLUTIONARY AND ETHNIC WARS**

Definitions and coding instructions for the case selection and updates of revolutionary and ethnic wars for the State Failure Problem Set are summarized in the following sections. Cases and codings are based on information compiled from multiple sources; discrepancies in the historical records are scrutinized and reconciled by analysts to construct unitary estimates of factors that identify and characterize each distinct event. “Wars” are unique political events that are characterized by the concerted (or major) tactical and strategic use of organized violence in an attempt by political and/or military leaders to gain a favorable outcome in an ongoing, group conflict interaction process. “Revolutionary and ethnic wars” are both primarily internal, domestic, civil, intrastate, or “societal” wars, although they are often “internationalized” to some extent as one or more of the contending groups may receive substantial indirect, or direct, support from foreign governments or other groups.

“Societal wars” are distinguished from “normal conflict processes” by the use of organized, lethal violence; from “terrorist campaigns” by the magnitude, intensity, and nature of the use of violence; and from “inter-communal violence” by the active involvement of state authorities and the professed (or perceived) goal of the contending non-state group to change the established political structure or status quo. Societal wars, thus, can be **identified** as major armed conflicts between state authorities and mobilized oppositional groups and can be **measured** by the number of deaths that result directly from organized violence. Individual reports and general estimates of deaths caused by violent conflicts often vary widely and, so, wars can not be measured exactly but only estimated. As organized violence is the defining quality of societal wars, war events are defined by the evidentiary use of systematic violence, that is, by evidence of substantial deaths that result from the use of violence by contending authorities (see “event identification thresholds” explained below). Political conflict interactions may often be explained as having a long history of animosity punctuated by sporadic violence; no attempt is made to identify the “historical roots” of conflict or group hostility. War events are defined as beginning with the appearance of substantial armed conflict and ending with the disappearance of substantial armed conflict.

## **II.1 General Definitions and Distinctions**

**Revolutionary wars** are episodes of violent conflict between governments and politically organized groups (political challengers) that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region. Conflicts must include substantial use of violence by one or both parties to qualify as “wars.”

“Politically organized groups” may include revolutionary and reform movements, political parties, student and labor organizations, and elements of the armed forces and the regime itself. If the challenging group represents a national, ethnic, or other communal minority, the conflict is analyzed as an ethnic war, below.

From the 1950s through the late 1980s most political wars were fought by guerrilla armies organized by clandestine political movements. Some, usually smaller in scale, relied wholly or in part on campaigns of terrorism. A few, like the Iranian revolution of 1979, were mass movements that organized campaigns of demonstrations. The violence and fatalities in conflicts of this type were mainly the result of government repression. The student movement in China that was suppressed in the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 is another example. Most mass movements that precipitated the fall of East European communist governments in 1989-90 do NOT qualify as revolutionary wars because neither party used substantial violence.

*Event Identification Thresholds:* There are the two minimum thresholds for including a political conflict in the state failure problem set: a *mobilization threshold*, wherein each party must mobilize 1000 or more people (armed agents, demonstrators, troops), and a *conflict intensity threshold*, whereby there must be at least 1000 direct conflict-related deaths over the full course of the armed conflict and at least one year when the annual conflict-related death toll exceeds 100 fatalities. The fatalities may result from armed conflict, terrorism, rioting, or government repression. The “full course” of the armed conflict is defined as a continual episode of armed

conflict between agents of the state and agents of the opposition group during which there is no period greater than three years when annual conflict-related fatalities are fewer than 100 in each year, see section II.2 below (“Dating Beginning and Ending of Conflict”).

Note that if a government perpetrates mass murder against unarmed civilians who are suspected of supporting a political movement, then two analytically distinct events may be coded: a political war and a genocide or politicide (mass murders of political opponents by agents of the state are usually considered politicides).

**Ethnic wars** are episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status. Most ethnic wars since 1955 have been guerrilla or civil wars in which the challengers have sought independence or regional autonomy. A few, like the events in South Africa's black townships in 1976-77, involve large-scale demonstrations and riots aimed at sweeping political reform that were violently suppressed by police and military. Rioting and warfare between rival communal groups is NOT coded as ethnic warfare unless it involves conflict over political power or government policy.

As with revolutionary wars, there are the two minimum thresholds for including an ethnic war event in the state failure problem set: a *mobilization threshold*, wherein each party must mobilize 1000 or more people (armed agents, demonstrators, troops), and a *conflict intensity threshold*, whereby there must be at least 1000 direct conflict-related deaths over the full course of the armed conflict and at least one year when the annual conflict-related death toll exceeds 100 fatalities. The fatalities may result from armed conflict, terrorism, rioting, or government repression. The “full course” of the armed conflict is defined as a continual episode of armed conflict between agents of the state and agents of the opposition group during which there is no period greater than three years when annual conflict-related fatalities are fewer than 100 in each year, see section II.2 below (“Dating Beginning and Ending of Conflict”).

Note that, as with revolutionary wars, if a government perpetrates political mass murder against unarmed members of a rebellious communal group, then two analytically-distinct events may be coded: an ethnic war and a genocide or politicide (the mass murder of members of a distinct ethnic group by agents of the state are usually considered genocide).

## **II.2 Dating Beginning and Ending of Open Armed Conflict (Wars)**

*When Open Armed Conflict Began (MOBEGIN and YRBEGIN):* Record the month and year in which the militant or violent phase of the conflict began. Conflict interactions, including sporadic violent incidents, involving opposition group agents and state authorities may take place for many months or several years prior to the escalation of the conflict to serious, organized violence. “Open armed conflict” is generally recognized as beginning when more than 100 conflict-related fatalities are recorded in a single year. Often, an “open armed conflict” phase in a social conflict interaction will be defined by an overt, symbolic or decisive action that is readily identified and dated. Many times, the intensity of violence used in a conflict interaction increases slowly or erratically over time. If the month cannot be determined from sources, estimate the

quarter--winter, spring, summer, fall--in which open conflict began and convert these codings to months: January for winter, April for spring, July for summer, October for fall.

Ordinarily, open armed conflict results from a conscious, strategic policy on the part of one or both conflict groups; in this case, date armed conflicts from the month in which the first attacks or clashes occur. For example, the Cuban revolution is dated from the month in which Castro and his followers landed in Cuba. The uprisings that began in 1976 in black townships in South Africa are dated from the month in which the first serious clashes occurred between security forces and demonstrators.

*When Open Armed Conflict Ended (MOEND and YREND):* Record the last month and year of open armed conflict. If there is a decisive conclusion, such as seizure of power or signing of a peace agreement that ends almost all fighting, record the month and year of the concluding event and use the “Description” space to indicate the nature of that event. Many times, the intensity of open armed conflict falls below the minimum intensity threshold of 100 conflict-related deaths per year prior to the negotiation of a formal peace settlement. In this case, the open armed conflict phase of the conflict interaction is recorded as having ended in the year when the intensity finally falls and remains below the minimum violence threshold for a period of three continuous years. Use the “open armed conflict ended” variables to record the month and year of the ending of open hostilities and use the “Description” space to explain the nature of the end of the violence and to denote the date of any subsequent, formal peace settlement.

It may be to a degree arbitrary to identify an ending date because many political and ethnic wars “sputter” or fade away rather than coming to a decisive conclusion. Use this operational rule: If a war falls below the minimum armed conflict intensity threshold of 100 deaths per year and stays below that threshold for three consecutive years, the open, armed conflict episode is considered to have “ended” in the year when the intensity fell below the minimum intensity threshold. If it does resume after the third year or in following years, it is coded as a separate event.

### **II.3 Annual Magnitude Scales for Political and Ethnic Wars**

Precise information on fatalities on an annual basis (or even totals) is seldom available. And some episodes have effects that are disproportionate to their fatalities. Therefore three alternative scales for recording annual magnitudes are coded; these variables are described below. The annual magnitude score for each episode is the average of the three magnitude scores.

Each open armed conflict episode is coded on each of three magnitude scales separately for every calendar year during the “full course” of the ethnic or political war episode.

As a general rule, scales are coded “9” (for no data) if no information is available. But if contextual information provides the basis for an informed guess, for example that there were very few fatalities in a year, or that fighting was confined to a limited area of the country, the informed guess is translated into a coding judgment.

### **Magnitude scale 1 (MAGFIGHT): Number of rebel combatants or activists**

Code this scale based on source estimates of the number of “armed supporters,” “guerrillas,” etc. of rebel and political movements. If the ethnic or political challenge takes the form of a sequence of demonstrations and riots, use estimates of numbers of participants. If several rebel groups are operating in a country, estimate their total numbers. If estimates are available for some years but not others, use interpolations for intervening years. If ranges or alternative estimates are reported, use the mid-point. But if a marked decline in number of combatants occurs during the course of a year, use the higher number. For movements that rely mainly on terror tactics, such as Islamic militants in Algeria in the 1990s, use estimates of active members.

0	=	less than 100 combatants or activists
1	=	100 to 1000 combatants or activists
2	=	1000 to 5,000 combatants or activists
3	=	5,000 to 15,000 combatants or activists
4	=	more than 15,000 combatants or activists
9	=	no basis for judging

### **Magnitude scale 2 (MAGFATAL): Annual number of fatalities related to fighting**

Code based on source estimates of annual fatalities directly attributed to fighting, armed attacks, and political protest including rebel fighters and leaders, demonstrators, regime forces and officials, civilians massacred in war zones or caught in cross-fire, and victims of terrorist attacks. Exclude, insofar as possible, victims of government campaigns of genocide and politicide (coded separately), and victims of disease and starvation that result indirectly from open conflict.

0	=	less than 100 fatalities
1	=	100 to 1000 fatalities
2	=	1000 to 5000 fatalities
3	=	5,000 to 10,000 fatalities
4	=	more than 10,000 fatalities
9	=	no basis for judging



### **Magnitude scale 3 (MAGAREA): Portion of country affected by fighting**

Code based on source materials about how much of the country is directly or indirectly affected by fighting or political protest in a given year. A province, region, or city is “directly affected” if fighting/terrorist attacks/political protest occur there at any time during the year. It is “indirectly affected” if the area has significant spillover effects from nearby fighting, for example refugees flows, curtailment of public services, martial law imposed. If open conflict expands or contracts during the course of the year, code according to its greatest extent.

0	=	less than one-tenth of the country and no significant cities are directly or indirectly affected
1	=	one-tenth of the country (one province or state) and/or one or several provincial cities are directly or indirectly affected
2	=	more than one-tenth and up to one quarter of the country (several provinces or states) and/or the capital city are directly or indirectly affected
3	=	from one-quarter to one-half the country and/or most major urban areas are directly or indirectly affected
4	=	more than one-half the country is directly or indirectly affected
9	=	no basis for judging

### **Summary Annual Magnitude (AVEMAG): Average of the scores on the three alternative scales**

Indicator based on the average of the three magnitude scores described above. All decimal averages (i.e., non-integers) are assigned decimal scores of ".5" (e.g., both 1.33 and 1.67 averages are assigned the score "1.5"). In cases where there is a missing magnitude score, the average is computed using the two scores listed. There are no cases where there is more than one missing magnitude score.

## **II.4 Descriptions of Political and Ethnic War Events**

Each annual record contains variables that identify the case: COUNTRY provides the country name; CCODE (numeric) and SCODE (alpha) provide standard 3-character state identifier codes; and PTYPE is coded “1” to identify the record as an ethnic war and “2” to identify a political war event. In addition, the first annual record of each event contains a brief, narrative description of the event (DESC).

### III. ADVERSE REGIME CHANGES

Definitions and coding instructions for the case selection and updates are summarized in the first section. Codings are based on information contained in the Polity IV data base. For further information on the Polity IV data resource, or to obtain an electronic copy of the Polity IV dataset, go to Internet address <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity>.

#### III.1 Guidelines for Coding Adverse Regime Changes

**Adverse Regime Changes** are defined by the Political Instability Task Force as major, adverse shifts in patterns of governance, including major and abrupt shifts away from more open, electoral systems to more closed, authoritarian systems; revolutionary changes in political elites and the mode of governance; contested dissolution of federated states or secession of a substantial area of a state by extrajudicial means; and or near-total collapse of central state authority and the ability to govern.

Abrupt transitions from more authoritarian rule to more open, institutionalized governance systems, defined by the Political Instability Task Force as “democratic transitions,” are not considered state failures in this sense and, thus, are not included.

*Main Operational Criteria:* The main criterion used to identify adverse regime changes is the record of a six or more point drop in the value of a state’s POLITY index score over a period of three years or less. Most of the cases of adverse regime changes are identified in this way. Such changes may be accomplished by coup, fiat, or popular referendum. The POLITY index is a measure of the institutionalized regime authority characteristics of the central state; the index scale ranges from minus 10 (-10, fully institutionalized autocracy) to plus10 (+10, fully institutionalized democracy). Institutionalized regime authority characteristics are coded and POLITY indices are computed for each independent state in the world for each year since 1800 in the Polity IV dataset. In some cases, central regime authority collapses such that no coherent or consistent authority can be identified over a substantial period of time; these periods are considered “interregnums” in the Polity IV coding scheme and are assigned a “standardized authority code” of minus 77 (-77) in the Polity IV dataset. The “interregnum” code is the second criterion used to identify adverse regime changes.

*Borderline Cases:* Of course, the establishment of any definitional threshold is somewhat arbitrary. The six-point standard was identified through a thorough analysis of the Polity IV research and data. A six-point drop in a country’s POLITY score indicates that a substantial change has occurred in the authority characteristics of the regime; a six-point magnitude of change is associated with qualitative changes in the openness of executive politics or general political competitiveness. The Polity IV codings are considered to be accurate and reliable to within two points on the POLITY scale. As such, all borderline cases (i.e., cases within two points of the threshold number) are reviewed individually for final determination. Borderline cases constitute about fifteen percent of cases examined.

*Collapse of Central Authority:* Not all cases of adverse regime changes can be identified by changes in POLITY scores in the Polity IV dataset. About one-third of cases identified as adverse regime changes involve a complete or near-complete collapse of central state authority and institutions and the ability of established political elites to govern effectively.

**Revolutionary Changes.** Central authority may collapse and be replaced by a new regime comprising quite different governing structures, political elites, and/or sources of authority or modes of rule. Such “revolutionary changes” constitute profound changes in the ethnic, religious, or ideological orientation of institutionalized regime authority, although quite often they adopt authoritarian practices quite similar to those used by the regime they replaced. Revolutionary changes are considered adverse regime changes due to the requisite collapse of central authority that precedes and enables the establishment of the new regime and not due to a subjective comparison of the relative merits of the prior and post regimes.

**Contested State Dissolution.** Central authority may collapse due to internal pressures to dissolve the unity of the state and reconstitute authority in separate territorially-redefined administrative units, that is, new independent states. If a state is territorially reconstituted by legal instruments designed by and under the authority of the previous state, then the change is considered to have been accomplished via central authority and not through a collapse of that authority. If the political elites of the previous regime actively contest or resist the dissolution of the unity of the state, then the change is considered to be predicated on the collapse of the central authority of the previous state. State dissolutions are considered adverse regime changes due to the requisite collapse of central authority that precedes and enables the establishment of the successor states and not due to a subjective comparison of the relative merits of the prior and post change situations.

**Collapse of Central Authority.** Central authority may collapse, in whole or in large part, due to some fatal combination of internal pressures, challenges, corruption, poverty, leadership failure, elite or capital flight, external influences, or other dynamics that erode or undermine institutions and authority structures. In some extreme cases, there are no alternative elites or authority structures that can or will replace the failed governance system and an extended period of chaos or anarchy results. In less extreme forms of state collapse, institutions of state authority may continue to exist but their general capacity and capability to implement and enforce public policy are severely limited. While it is often the case that a (weak) central regime will be unable to extend their full authority to cover and control the entire territory under their sovereign jurisdiction, when a regime lacks the strength of authority to effectively govern at least half its sovereign obligation (that is, provide essential services and maintain a reasonably effective security and authority presence) measured in terms of population and territory, it is considered to be a failed state and, thus, an adverse regime change by the Political Instability Task Force. It is considered such regardless of the nature of the regime that eventually reestablishes authority over the territory and is considered so until such authority is reestablished.

### **III.2 Adverse Regime Change Beginning and Ending Dates**

Each annual record of a distinct adverse regime change event contains one variable (YEAR) that records the year of the annual record and four variables that code the beginning month (MOBEGIN) and year (YRBEGIN) and ending month (MOEND) and year (YREND) of the adverse regime change. The beginning and ending dates will be identical in all the annual records for a multi-year event. In many cases, the beginning and ending dates are the same; this most often occurs in cases involving a sudden coup. Some cases cover a decade or more; this occurs most often in cases involving a collapse of central state authority.

### **III.3 Annual Magnitude Scales for Adverse Regime Changes**

The State Failure Problem Set coding scheme makes use of the following three variables, each of which taps a different aspect of adverse regime change or collapse. Each scale is coded for each calendar year in which the political crisis is unresolved. The values assigned on the three variables are combined to provide a fourth variable: a general “magnitude of change” score for each year of an ongoing political crisis.

#### **Magnitude scale 1 (MAGFAIL): Failure of State Authority**

This scale refers to situations in which the institutions of the central state are so weakened that they can no longer maintain authority or political order in significant parts of the country. Evidence includes shut-downs of routine government services, failure of security forces and administrators to carry out any government directives, and anarchic conditions in large parts of the country, with rival militias, warlords, or local or regional authorities attempting to establish autonomous zones of government. Scores on this variable often will change from year to year during a political crisis, as the balances of power and authority shift between the central government and its challengers.

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | = | adverse regime change (defined above) with no significant weakening of state institutions or persistent collapse of public order  |
| 2 | = | failure of state authority in a limited part of the country, e.g., secession or rebel control of, or anarchic conditions in, one or several regions that do not include the core area of the country or its capital |
| 3 | = | failure of state authority in a substantial part of the country, or in the capital and its environs   |
| 4 | = | complete collapse or near-total failure of state authority  |
| 9 | = | no basis for judging  |

### **Magnitude scale 2 (MAGCOL): Collapse of Democratic Institutions**

This scale is used to characterize situations in which democratic or quasi-democratic institutions are weakened or replaced, through the use or threat of force, by autocratic political institutions. A “democratic” regime is one whose POLITY score is greater than +5, a “quasi-democratic regime” is one with a POLITY score less than +6 and greater than zero (0), an “autocratic” polity has a POLITY score less than +1 (i.e., zero to minus ten). The coding on the Magnitude 2 scale usually remains the same during a multi-year regime crisis. In some instances, though, there are codable shifts as a result of abortive efforts to establish a new regime.

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | = | abrupt or disruptive transitions within autocratic political systems, i.e. from one set of authoritarian leaders to another or one type of autocracy to another |
| 2 | = | democratic or quasi-democratic institutions continue to exist but in circumstances of violent challenge and weakening of central authority                      |
| 3 | = | a quasi-democratic polity is forcefully replaced (by violence or threat of violence) by an autocratic political system  |
| 4 | = | a fully democratic polity is forcefully replaced (by violence or threat of violence) by an autocratic political system  |
| 9 | = | no basis for judging  |

### **Magnitude scale 3 (MAGVIOL): Violence Associated with Adverse Regime Changes**

This scale records the extent to which the contenders for state power during an adverse regime change use armed violence against the state. The coding on this scale will often change during a multi-year regime crisis.

- |   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| 1 | = | adverse regime change, no significant armed violence   |
| 2 | = | armed violence occurs mainly in outlying regions   |
| 3 | = | armed violence is limited mainly to the capital and a few other locales, as in the case of violent coups |
| 4 | = | armed violence is widespread, affecting the capital and a number of other regions                        |
| 9 | = | no basis for judging   |

**Summary Annual Magnitude (MAGAVE): Average of the scores on the three scales**

Indicator based on the average of the three magnitude scores described above. All decimal averages (i.e., non-integers) are assigned decimal scores of ".5" (e.g., both 1.33 and 1.67 averages are assigned the score "1.5"). In cases where there is a missing magnitude score, the average is computed using the two scores listed. There are no cases where there is more than one missing magnitude score.

**III.4 Descriptions of Adverse Regime Changes**

Each annual record contains variables that identify the case: COUNTRY provides the country name; CCODE (numeric) and SCODE (alpha) provide standard 3-character state identifier codes; and PTYPE is coded "3" to identify the record as an adverse regime change event. In addition, the first annual record of each adverse regime change case contains a brief, narrative description of the event (DESC) and an indicator (POLITYX) of the nature of the regime change. POLITYX may be a number from minus twenty (-20) to minus five (-5) to indicate the degree of change in the regime's POLITY value over the course of the adverse regime change, or it may be an alpha code to indicate the nature of a case defined by a collapse of central authority (REV—revolutionary change; DIS—contested state dissolution; or SF—failed state).

**IV. GENOCIDE AND POLITICIDE**

The first section summarizes the general definitions and distinctions used for identifying and coding genocide and politicide events. The guidelines were originally formulated by Barbara Harff. The Genocide and Politicide event list is no longer being updated as of 2010. From an operational perspective, as genocides and politicides involve the intentional targeting of civilian populations for systematic, lethal political violence, these events have been observed to rarely, if ever, occur independently of other major political violence events. As such, the identification of these types of events is not necessary for the operational determination of episodes of political instability; they are, rather, a potentially grave consequence of political instability. Also, as civilian populations are, by definition, essentially unprotected individuals, they are almost invariably included among the victims of political violence. Establishing an intent to target civilian populations by a "state" acting through directives to its official agents is often difficult to conclude objectively without material evidence of explicit policies in that regard. The question of how or why civilian populations are victimized by political violence is a more general concern that is directly related to our research on the risks of the onset, the drivers of persistence, and the direct consequences of political violence.

**IV.1 General Definitions and Distinctions**

Genocide and politicide events involve the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents -- or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities -- that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non-communal group. In genocides the victimized groups are defined primarily in

terms of their communal (ethnolinguistic, religious) characteristics. In politicides, by contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups.

Genocide and politicide are distinguished from state repression and terror. In cases of state terror authorities arrest, persecute or execute a few members of a group in ways designed to terrorize the majority of the group into passivity or acquiescence. In the case of genocide and politicide authorities physically exterminate enough (not necessarily all) members of a target group so that it can no longer pose any conceivable threat to their rule or interests.

**Operational Criteria:**

(1) Authorities' complicity in mass murder must be established. Any persistent, coherent pattern of action by the state and its agents, or by a dominant social group, that brings about the destruction of a people's existence, in whole or in part, within the effective territorial control of a ruling authority is prima facie evidence of that state, or other, authority's responsibility. In situations of civil war (i.e., contested territorial control) either of the contending authorities may be deemed responsible for carrying out, or allowing, such actions.

(2) The physical destruction of a people requires time to accomplish: it implies a persistent, coherent pattern of action. Thus, only sustained episodes that last six months or more are included in the final dataset. This six month requirement is to a degree arbitrary. At the other end of the time spectrum are episodic attacks on a group that recur periodically, such as Iraqi government attacks on Kurds from 1960 to 1975. Annual codings are especially important for these kinds of episodes to permit tracking of peaks and lulls.

(3) The victims to be counted are unarmed civilians, not combatants. It rarely is possible to distinguish precisely between the two categories in the source materials. Certain kinds of tactics nonetheless are indicative of authorities' systematic targeting of noncombatants: massacres, unrestrained bombing and shelling of civilian-inhabited areas, declaration of free-fire zones, starvation by prolonged interdiction of food supplies, forced expulsion ("ethnic cleansing") accompanied by extreme privation and killings, etc.

(4) In principle, numbers provided in "body counts" do not enter the definition of what constitutes an episode. A "few hundred" killed constitutes as much a genocide or politicide as the deaths of thousands if the victim group is small in number to begin with.

**Note:** Definitions and operational guidelines are adapted from Barbara Harff and T. R. Gurr, "Victims of the State: Genocides, Politicides, and Group Repression from 1945 to 1995," pp. 33-58 in Albert J. Jongman (ed.), *Contemporary Genocides: Causes, Cases, Consequences* (Leiden: University of Leiden, PIOOM--Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations, 1996).

## IV.2 Guidelines for Coding Genocides and Politicides (Dates and Deaths)

**When Episode Begins:** Records the month in which systematic killings are reported to have started. If the month could not be determined reliably from sources, the quarter--winter, spring, summer, fall--in which the killings began is estimated and converted to months: January for winter, April for spring, July for summer, October for fall.

**When Episode Ends:** The end of systematic killing often is difficult to determine. The overthrow of a genocidal regime usually is decisive, e.g. the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. In other instances the end can be dated from the occurrence of the last serious atrocities, the end of a military campaign that targets civilian areas, or simply the absence of any further reports (e.g., from news sources, US State Department, or Amnesty International) of deliberate killings. The ending month is coded only if it can be inferred from the above kinds of information.

Several alternative magnitude scales were tried but could not be coded reliably because of inadequate data. Cumulative and annual estimates of civilian deaths were identified from multiple sources and used to code the following scale. In a few cases no annual variations in intensity of killing could be assessed, therefore total estimated deaths were pro-rated over the entire period. Substantially more research could be done on this issue, with some improvement in the reliability of the codings.

**Magnitude scale (DEATHMAG):** *Annual number of deaths*

0	less than 300
0.5	300 - 1000
1.0	1000 - 2000
1.5	2000 - 4000
2.0	4000 - 8000
2.5	8000 - 16,000
3.0	16,000 - 32,000
3.5	32,000 - 64,000
4.0	64,000 - 128,000
4.5	128,000 - 256,000
5.0	256,000 +